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ANTITRUST AND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE SALE OF
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
BY L. GENE LEMON*
One of the hottest topics in agricultural circles today is collective
bargaining in the sale of agricultural products. Not only are farmers
talking-and doing something'-about it, but the politicians are
talking about it; 2 both the Senate3  and the House of Repre-
sentatives 4 of the United States have held hearings on it within
the last year; newspapers headline it,5 and the President, in his
State of the Union message of 1968, vowed to encourage it.6
What is collective bargaining? Basically, it is little more than
an idea at the present time. Many people in agriculture are now
realizing that the Great Depression legislation for labor has served
industrial workers better than the Great Depression legislation for
agriculture has served farmers and ranchers. 7 Agriculture wants
to choose again.
This article will outline some rather practical considerations
relevant to the subject for practitioners, cooperative leaders and
regarding organization, negotiations, and other operations within
* Member of the Illinois Bar; B.S. (Agr.), L.L.B., University of Illinois; presently
Assistant General Counsel, American Farm Bureau Federation, Chicago, Illinois. The
views expressed herein are the author's own and are not to be imputed to any agricul-
tural organization.
1. laFm, Mar. 31, 1967, at 4.
2. TIME, Nov. 3, 1967, at 18.
3. Hearings on S. 109 Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Research and Gen. Legis-
lation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
4. Hearings on S. 109 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
5. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 13, 1967, at 24, col. 1.
6. 114 CONG. Rac. H98, H101 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 1968).
7. Compare Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1964)
and Nat'l. Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§
151-158, 159-166 (1964), with Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), and Agri-
cultural' Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50, Stat. 246 (1937), 7 U.S.C. § 601 et. seq.
(1964). Through the creation of a federal board, certification elections, and enforced ne-
gotiations labor obtained a strong bargaining position. Agriculture, however, received
acreage allotments and price supports on a voluntary basis, and federal price fixing and
production controls through marketing orders which did not greatly improve the farmers'
bargaining position.
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present legal bounds. Also, voids in this area of the law as well
as the possibilities for using labor precedents in agriculture's col-
lective bargaining activities will be considered. Very little considera-
tion will be given to state cooperative acts, federal income tax
law, securities law, and other applicable statutes outside of the
trade regulation field.
I. FEDERAL GRANTS OF AUTHORITY
The first federal statute in the trade regulation field was, of
course, the Sherman Act s enacted in 1890. While it probably was
not intended to outlaw farmers' cooperatives, there was some feeling
at the time that its terms-making it a crime to contract or com-
bine in restraint of trade, or attempt to monopolize any part of
commerce-would prohibit associations of farmers.9 While the 'rule
of reason' might have eventually allayed those fears, a specific
statutory provision was obtained at the first opportuinty to assure
farmers that joining a cooperative was not equivalent to entering
a combination in restraint of trade. 10
While exemption was gained for non-stock cooperatives, stock
cooperatives remained in doubt as to their standing under the anti-
trust laws. Non-stock cooperatives, however, were not enamoured
with the Clayton Act language which granted them protection only
while "lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof." At
least one court has written an opinion containing unfavorable dicta. 1
Then, too, there probably was a concern by others that some limit
should be placed upon the ability of cooperatives to increase the
price of food.
12
In answer to all these concerns, Congress enacted the Capper-
Volstead Act in 1922.12 In its opening lines, allowing persons who,
8. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
9. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REc. 2726 (1890).
10. Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-,27 (1964). The exemption pro-
vision of the act states: "[T]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted
for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects therof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof,
be held or construed to be Illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, un-
der the antitrust laws." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
11. United States v. King, 229 F. 275 (D. Mass. 1915). The court stated that, although
section 6 confers upon a cooperative the right to associate and enter the market as a
unit, section 6 does not give a cooperative any rights greater than that of an ordinary
business corporation. The court's opinion has not been entirely rejected today and threads
of this argument may be found in Milk Producers As'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960).
12. Even in the "good old days" before modern antitrust rules developed, raising the
price of food wa4 a rather unpopular thing to do. Thus, the act of the English Parlia-
ment during the reign of Edward VI prohibiting forestalling, engrossing and regrating
(Statutes at Large, 7 Edw. VI vol. 5, ch. 14) became part of this country's common law.
See State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R.I. 254, 70 At. 1 (1908).
13. 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (1964). The text of the Capper-Volstead
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"as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers, '14
produce agricultural products to form cooperative businesses, the
Capper-Volstead legislation encourages litigation. Since vegetable
growers are not mentioned and since nut and fruit growers are,
should there be any concern over the omission? There is no reason
to believe that any agricultural commodities were intended to be
omitted, and certainly some vegetable growers sell their products
cooperatively.
Act is as follows:
SEC. 1. That persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as
farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in
associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively
processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign
commerce, such products of persons so engaged. Such associations may have mar-
keting agencies in common; and such associations and their members may make
the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes: Provided, how-
ever, that such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of the members
thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both of the following require-
ments:
First. That no member of the association is allowed more than one vote be-
cause of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein, or,
Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or member-
ship capital in excess of 8 per centum per annum.
And in any case to the following:
Third. That the association shall not deal in the products of nonmembers to
an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for members.
SEC. 2. If the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that any
such association monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce
to such an extent that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced
by reason thereof, he shall serve upon such association a complaint stating his
charge in that respect, to which complaint shall be attached, or contained there-
in, a notice of hearing, specifying a day and place not less than thirty days after
the service thereof, requiring the association to show cause why an order should
not be made directing it to cease and desist from monopolization or restraint of
trade. An association so complained of may at the time and place so fixed show
cause why such order should not be entered. The evidence given on such a hearing
shall be taken under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Agriculture
may prescribe, reduced to writing, and made a part of the record therein. If upon
such hearing the Secretary of Agriculture shall be of the opinion that such as-
sociation monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce to such
an extent that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced thereby,
he shall issue and cause to be served upon the association an order reciting the
facts found by him, directing such association to cease and desist from monopoli-
zation or restraint of trade. On the request of such association or if such associa-
tion fails or neglects for thirty days to obey such order, the Secretary of Agricul-
ture shall file in the district court in the judicial district in which such associa-
tion has its principal place of business a certified copy of the order and of all the
records in the proceeding, together with a petition asking that the order be en-
forced, and shall give notice to the Attorney General and to said association of
such filing. Such district court shall thereupon have jurisdiction to enter a decree
affirming, modifying, or setting aside said order, or enter such other decree as
the court may deem equitable, and may make rules as to pleadings and proceed-
ings to be had in considering such order. The place of trial may, for cause or by
consent of parties, be changed as in other causes.
The facts found by the Secretary of Agriculture and recited or set forth in
said order shall be prima facie evidence of such facts, but either party may ad-
duce additional evidence. The Department of Justice shall have charge of the en-
forcement of such order. After the order is so filed in such district court and while
pending for review therein the court may issue a temporary writ of injunction
forbidding such association from violating such order or any part thereof. The
court may, upon conclusion of its hearing, enforce its decree by a permanent in-
junction or other appropriate remedy. Service of such complaint and of all notices
may be made upon such association by service upon any officer or agent thereof
engaged In carrying on its business, or on any attorney authorized to appear in
such proceeding for such association, and such service shall be binding upon such
association, the officers, and members thereof.
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Capper-Volstead covers all forms of cooperatives-"corporate or
otherwise, with or without capital stock." 15 Since Clayton, applying
only to non-stock cooperatives, contains the "legitimate objects"
test and Capper-Volstead does not, may one assume that stock
cooperatives need not confine themselves to legitimate objects? Such
an argument cannot be sustained.'8
The Act allows growers to associate "in collectively processing,
preparing for market, handling, and marketing" agricultural prod-
ucts.'7 Whether the enumeration of these four activities is intended
to deny antitrust exemption to cooperative acts not named is a
concern. Antitrust exemption may not be available to purchasing
(farm supply) cooperatives.' For purposes of this article, however,
the four enumerated activities are not of serious concern because
collective bargaining is a form of marketing and is therefore included
in the statute. 19
Associations are given the right to have marketing agencies in
common and to make contracts and agreements to effect their
purposes.20 This provision is amplified by the Cooperative Market-
ing Act of 1926, 21 which provides authority for federations of co-
operative marketing associations and for the acquisition and ex-
change of past, present and prospective market information by and
among farmers or their cooperatives.
2
Two other federal acts deserve brief mention. The Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 allows marketing agreements and
marketing orders authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture which,
for antitrust purposes, will justify activities of cooperatives acting
under such agreements or orders. 2 The Robinson-Patman Act, in
section 4, provides that a cooperative may return to its members
or patrons refunds or dividends from earnings without violating its
pricing provisions.
2
14. I. § 1.
15. Id.
16. The United States Supreme Court has said, " . .. [T]he full effect of § 6 is that
a group of farmers acting together as a single entity in an association cannot be re-
strained 'from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof' . .. . [T]he Capper-
Volstead Act of 1922 extended § 6 of the Clayton Act exemption to capital stock agricul-
tural cooperatives which had previously been covered by that section. Section 1 of the
Capper-Volstead Act also provided that among the 'legitimate objects' of farmer organiza-
tions were .... " Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 465-66 (1960). The
Court seems today to read both laws together.
17. Capper-Volstead, supra note 13, at § 1.
18. L.S. HULBEtT & RlJ. M scHLF, LEGAL PHASES Op FARMER COOPERATIVES 169 (Far-
mer Cooperative Service Bull. No. 10, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Hulbert].
19. Most of the milk producers cooperatives have engaged in bargaining, in one way
or another, for many years, at least with respect to class I milk. Several have been In-
volved in litigtion and have relied upon Capper-Volstead as a defense. See the various
21. 44 Stat. 802 (1926), 7 U.S.C. §§ 451-57 (1964).
22. 7 U.S.C. § 455 (1964). In the past year the Federal Trade Commission has advised
that agricultural cooperatives may establish a common sales agency and cause it to
market their members' products. (Advisory Opinion Digest 124, May 5, 1967).
23. 7 U.S.C. § 608(b) ; see 7 U.S.C. 5 608(c) (1964).
24. 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
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II. ORGANIZING FOR EXEMPTION
A. Statutory Requirements
If a farmer's bargaining association plans to win its antitrust
litigation in the future, it must be prepared to affirmatively plead
and prove that it has met the organizational prerequisites to the
Capper-Volstead Act's benefits.25 The organizational tests are as
follows:
(1) An association of agricultural producers,
(2) operated, in itself, on a non-profit basis
(3) for the mutual benefit of its members as producers,
(4) not dealing in a greater dollar volume of nonmembers'
products than the value of products handled by it for mem-
bers, and either
(5) conducted on a one-member, one-vote basis or
(6) not paying dividends on capital in excess of eight percent
per year.
26
The following comments, regarding the various organizational
tests, are placed in numbered paragraphs in order to correspond
with the item numbers above. 1. Generally speaking, only associa-
tions whose voting stock is held solely by producers, in the case
of organizations with capital stock, or whose memberships are held
solely by producers, in the case of non-stock cooperatives, can
come within the antitrust exemption. 27 Nevertheless, it seems clear
that an association whose members are all Capper-Volstead coopera-
tives, and hence not producers, is entitled to equivalent benefits.2
Fundamentally, an association may admit as members or voting
stockholders any producers or agricultural organizations which are
themselves controlled by producers, the reason for the requirement
being to limit market share to that which is possessed by producers
themselves.29 Private elevators, trucking companies, market agen-
cies or other non-producers are, of course, ineligible. Only persons
who take the risks and responsibilities of the owner of growing
crops or livestock are producers; 30 salaried farm managers, cash-
rent lessors and hired "hands" are not producers.
25. Compare Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod's Co., 370 U.S.
19 (1962), with Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967). In the
former case, it was stipulated that Sunkist was a Capper-Volstead Cooperative; in the
latter, Sunkist had to plead and prove, and it was not successful.
26. Clayton Act, supra note 10; Capper-Volstead Act, supra note 18, at § 1.
27. Hulbert, supra note 18, at 171.
28. See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 8uVra note 25.
29. Id,
30. Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-422, 1967-68 INT. Rov. Butj. at 12.
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2. The non-profit idea is more or less a hoary chestnut of coopera-
tive law and is intended, with the third requirement, to encourage
distributions on a patronage basis rather than on a capital contri-
butions or equal shares basis. Certainly, it is not intended to pre-
clude business-like operations, private benefit, etc.
3. Operations for the mutual benefit of members as producers
require, again, distributions on a patronage basis. Also, it seems,
the requirement carries with it the idea of absolute farmer control,
sufficient at least that the actions of the association serve producers
rather than another economic interest. The "mutual benefit" clause
of Capper-Volstead may be the twin brother to Clayton's "legitimate
objects" standard. Certain price-fixing and exclusive dealing agree-
ments and operations may be upheld under this provision.3 1
4. The member vis-a-vis nonmember business requirement is dif-
ficult. All commodities not actually produced by members, but
which are marketed by an association, come under nonmember
business.3 2 This is the case even when a member delivers com-
modities not produced by him to the association for marketing.
Very close bookkeeping is required.
Interestingly enough, there is basis for the proposition that non-
member business cannot be conducted in any products not pro-
duced by members.3 3 The bargaining cooperatives which merely
meet with buyers and negotiate master contracts and then authorize
their members to sign the approved contracts for whatever quan-
tities they desire may have great difficulty proving the amount of
products "handled" for members, let alone the extent of their non-
member business.
5. Little needs to be said of the one-member, one-vote requirement.
Suffice it to say that it is optional, for the requirement discussed in
the next paragraph may be met in lieu thereof. Where large cor-
porate farms exist beside very small farms, this requirement is
difficult from a practical point of view. Whether this requirement
is met or not, all votes must be, directly or indirectly, producer
votes; no other economic interest is allowable.3 4
6. Since dividend distributions may not exceed eight percent and
may be limited to a lesser percentage, a bylaw authorizing patronage
distributions may be desirable. The eight percent requirement
relates to capital contributions, and it is placed high enough to
31. See Florida Citrus Mutual, 53 F.T.C. 973, 10-10 (1957). See also, note 84 infra.
32. Hulbert, aupra note 18, at 171.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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attract nonproducer capital, which may be accepted if there are
not too many strings attached.3
5
It is interesting to note that, with all the requirements, none
relates to organizational form. As a result bargaining groups have
formed as unincorporated associations, farmers cooperatives (both
stock and nonstock), not-for-profit corporations, and regular business,
corporations. This seems basically to be a state law question of no
significance to federal antitrust law.
3 6
B. Form
This is the era of the conglomerate corporation, sophisticated
management and business techniques, long-range planning, advance
contracting and advertising. The bargaining strength of food proces-
sors and packers has grown tremendously, nearly drowning that of
the individual farmer or rancher. Successful national multi-com-
modity producers' bargaining associations are a necessity to pre-
vent growers from becoming either serfs to big business or pawns
to government.
Cooperatives such as Sunkist, Ocean Spray (cranberries), and
Welch (grapes) cannot be built today for many other commodities-
the capital requirements are too great and the production areas
too widely scattered.
Some of the keys to the development, then, of farmers' economic
power lie in the amount of latitude permitted in organizing bar-
gaining units. The Clayton Act and Capper-Volstead Act imply the
privilege of building a monopoly and at least one court has stated
that a cooperative may acquire a 100 percent position in a market."
There is legal authority permitting the inclusion of more than one
agricultural product in a marketing association. 8 However, there
is no room for coercion in attempting to increase association
membership.
3 9
With these opportunities and limits established, the question is:
How can a bargaining unit gain control of sufficient agricultural
production to have a price influence? Success will directly related
to the volume subject to bargaining.
40
There are two possible forms:41
35. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., supra note 25.
36. See 36 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 326, 339-40 (1930).
37. See Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. Nat'l Cranberry Ass'n 119 F.Supp. 900, 907
(D. Mass. 1954).
38. Initial decision in Florida Citrus Mutual, 53 F.T.C. 973 (1957), modified on other
grounds, 53 F.T.C. 999 (1957).
39. United States v. Nat'l Farmers Organization, settled, BNA ATTR No. 334, p. A-7
(S.D. Iowa Dec. 4, 1967).
40. Most of the bargaining associations have found that without having 60 to 70
percent of the product market, the price pattern will be established in the open market
before buyers attempt to acquire products from the association.
41. See United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F.Supp. 151,
154 (D.D.C. 1956).
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(1) A giant direct membership association may be formed,' 2 or
(2) local bargaining groups may, through contracts and mem-
bership arrangements, form a large federation.43
The primary problems with the giant association are related
to the traditional independence of farmers and ranchers. Producers
and growers firmly believe in local control of their affairs and are
reluctant to part with authority to make marketing decisions,
especially if the authority leaves for some distant headquarters.
44
The federation approach is not, however, without its problems.
Since in the typical milk bargaining cooperative, which acts only
as agent in negotiations with buyers, title passes directly from the
dairyman to the buyer, a federation of bargaining cooperatives
might be viewed as merely a trade association having no anti-
trust privileges, an unwarranted result.4 5 Authority which firmly
establishes the legality of combinations between cooperatives, in-
cluding the use of common agents is growing.
4 s
III. COOPERATIVE OPERATIONS-PROHIBITIONS
Outside of agriculture, there are plenty of cases on price fixing,
exclusive dealing, mergers, attempts to monopolize, etc., to guide,
with some certainty, practitioners and businessmen. The same cannot
be said for agricultural bargaining associations.
For many years, it was widely thought that the Clayton and
Capper-Volstead Acts entirely exempted cooperatives from the anti-
trust laws. Those who so believed were not well served by Judge
McColloch, who wrote:
I am asked to hold that under certain circumstances . . .
a farmer's cooperative can be punished as a monopoly ....
[In short, I am asked to scuttle the plain language of the
Clayton Act as to cooperatives, as anti-labor courts scuttled
the labor provisions of the same act ....
It may be that the acts of the defendant cooperative in
this case, tested without regard to the provisions of the
42. Cape Cod Food Products, Inc., v. Nat'l Cranberry Ass'n, supra note 37.
48. Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926, supra note 21.
44. It may also be true that a direct membership national association is required to
perform acts which get news headlines rather than acts which improve marketing be-
cause of the need to attract farmer interest and membership. If this is the case, the acts
perofrmed may lead to legal problems discussed infra.
45. An F.T.C. hearing examiner thought a Florida citrus cooperative functioned as a
trade association. Initial decision, Florida Citrus Mutual, 53 F.T.C. 973, 985 (1957).
However, the Commission disregarded the suggestion and held that the cooperative could
negotiate prices even though the fruit growers actually made direct sales. Id. at 999.
46. E.g., United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F.Supp.
151 (D.D.C. 1956); F.T.C. Advisory Opinion (The Advisory Opinion Digest 124, May 5,
1967). In this case the complaint alleged a conspiracy to fix prices effected by employees
who served both defendant cooperatives simultaneously. (Transcript of Record, at 10).
The case was dismissed without comment on this issue, giving some basis for an opinion
that a common agent under the Capper-Volstead Act may be a common employee.
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Clayton Act, are monopolistic in character. I have not given
serious thought to that question, for it seems to me when Con-
gress said cooperatives were not to be punished, even though
they became monopolistic, it would be as ill-considered for
me to hold to the contrary as were some of the early labor de-
cisions.
4 7
The above quotation is not the law and likely was not the law
when it was written. Furthermore, any reliance upon it is sheer
folly because cooperatives simply are not exempt from antitrust
laws. Farmers' associations do have, however, certain privileges
under trade laws which other business firms do not possess. This
section explores the limits of these privileges.
A. Price Fixing
The very raison d'etre of agricultural marketing associations is
price fixing. If this action is viewed as one in which private enter-
prises (farms) have combined to restrain trade, it would be illegal
but for the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts. But this action
should be viewed as one where a single business entity determines
the price at which it will sell its products.
48
If, however, a cooperative combines or conspires with "other
persons," it is only a matter of time before a complaint is filed.
4
1
The Borden case does not, in this day, require extended discussion.
Suffice it to say that the Pure Milk Association, a dairymen's
bargaining cooperative, had joined with officials of the City of
Chicago, distributors, handlers, labor unions, arbitrators, and others
to fix the price of milk and to regulate its supply in the Chicago
market. The consent decree under which Pure Milk Association
operates as a result of the Borden case prevents the cooperative
from (1) requiring distributors who purchase from nonmembers
to use terms of purchase specified by the cooperative or agreed
upon by the cooperative and distributors, (2) fixing prices to be
paid to independent producers, and (3) engaging in resale price
maintenance practices. 50
When associations are engaged in price-making activities, it
is advisable for them to meet with prospective purchasers one at
a time, refraining from attempting to negotiate through trade as-
47. United States v. Dairy Co-op Ass'n, 49 F.Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943). The case
related to the alleged acquisition of membership by coercion, a practice which does not
always meet Judicial approval. See United States v. Nat'l Farmers Organization, supra
note 39.
48. Hulbert, supra note 18, at 172.
49. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). The Court stated: "The right
of these agricultural producers . . . to unite . . . cannot be deemed to authorize any
combination or conspiracy with other persons in restraint of trade . 308 U.S. 188,
204-05 (emphasis added).
50. Consent decree, United States v. Borden Co., 9 U.S.LW. 2201, 2202 (N.D. Ill. 1940).
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sociations, 51 and to form purchase agreements which go no further
than is necessary to market the products which the association
has to offer.
The Justice Department for a time apparently viewed price
fixing agreements between cooperatives as illegal. In the mid-1950's,
it sought to extend the "other persons" rule of the Borden case
to combinations of bargaining associations.5 2 Judge Holtzoff, in a
well-considered opinion, decided the test case in favor of the co-
operative by reasoning, first, that the legality of the actions of a
group of farmers should not depend on the question of whether
they organized one large cooperative or several smaller ones, 53 and
second, that the statute allowed a common marketing agent and
"it must have been contemplated that a common marketing agency
would fix the same prices for the products of all of its principals
and would not discriminate among them. ' '5 4 He concluded:
that a combination between two or more agricultural coopera-
tives to fix prices of their products is exempt from the anti-
trust laws provided that no other person that is not such an
organization or a member of such a group is a part of the
combination. 55
At the time the above case was moving through litigation, the
Sunkist Growers were defending a treble damage case which finally
went to the United States Supreme Court.5 6 Sunkist was alleged
to have entered a conspiracy with a wholly-owned subsidiary and
with an affiliated processing cooperative, to the damage of the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court reasoned along the same lines as
did Judge Holtzoff,5 7 concluding:
That the packing is done by local associations, the adver-
tising, sales, and traffic by divisions of the area association,
and the processing by separate organizations does not in our
opinion preclude these growers from being considered one
organization or association for purposes of the Clayton and
Capper-Volstead Acts.
58
Finally, with regard to price fixing, it should be mentioned that
resale price maintenance is prohibited under the Borden case be-
51. Frequently, farmers unknowingly atempt to use this method since: (1) they solve
their -problems by group action and expect others to do likewise, and (2) this method
solves the problem of gaining recognition as a bargaining unit from individual purchasers.
52. United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, Inc., supra note 46, at 153.
53. Id. at 154.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 155.
56. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962).
57. Id. at 29.
58. Id.
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cause of the necessity for agreeing with "other persons" in order
to establish the control.
B. Production Limitation
The dicta is legion that associations may not, by terms of their
marketing contracts and membership agreements, regulate the pro-
duction of members. 9 Such incidental and voluntary restrictions
or production as may result from an association's educational bul-
letins, market reports, forecasts and recommendations are not il-
legal.6 ° The List Case,61 however, is not the best authority because
(1) there was an obvious surplus causing public expense, (2) the
United States Department of Agriculture was seeking voluntary
production restrictions, and (3) the efforts of all were unsuccessful.
Adding further to the above non-authority is United States v
Grower-Shippers Vegetable Ass'n 2 which is frequently cited as say-
ing that group crop destruction done otherwise than pursuant to
a government production control program is illegal. Had the case
been decided on its merits, however, in the Government's favor,
it would be poor authority for it involved a trade association rather
than a producers cooperative.
While it is doubtful that bargaining associations have any anti-
trust privilege to control production, the rule ought to be otherwise
for the following reasons:
1. Price is a function of supply (among other things) and
no cooperative can do much about price without some control
over supply. In fact, judging from the experience of various
Secretaries of Agriculture, no cooperative can do much about
price with some control over supply.
2. The Capper-Volstead Act allows collective activity in
preparing products for market, which can be construed to in-
clude production without torturing the words greatly; assuming
the statute is remedial, it ought to be liberally interpreted to
effect is purposes.
3. Under the widely embraced entity theory a cooperative
and its members are one unit just as is an industrial enterprise.
59. See, e.g., California Bean Growers' Ass'n v. Rindge Land & Nay. Co., 199 Cal. 168,
248 P. 658 (1926); Tobacco Growers' Co-op Ass'n v. Jones, 185 N.C. 269, 117 S.E. 174
(1923) Stark County Milk Producers Ass'n v. Tabeling, 129 Ohio St. 159, 194 N.E.16
(1934) Washington Cranberry Growers Ass'n v. Moore, 117 Wash. 430, 201 P. 773 (1921),
aff'd. on rehearing 204 P. 811 (1922).
60. List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471, 478
(1926).
61. Id.
62. Civil No. 30561, D.D. Cal., May 18, 1951, CCH FED. ANTITRUST LAws Case No.
1084, dismissed as moot, aff'd per curiam, 344 U.S. 901 (1952).
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The latter units regulate their production; the cooperative en-
tities could, too, if the theory were applied without reservation.
4. Since Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act prohibits
undue enhancement of prices, the public interest is adquately
protected against the possibility that a cooperative, exercising
control over production, would act irresponsibly. There should
be no reason for government supervision of production restric-
tions because of the many substitute products, both natural and
artificial, available and because of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture's jurisdiction over prices.
It is clear that associations may not agree with other persons
to limit either production or distribution of raw or processed agri-
cultural commodities.
6 3
C. Attempts to Monopolize
Section 2 of the Sherman Act 64 is hard to apply to cooperatives.
The very effort of farmers to associate into a successful bargaining
group is nothing more or less than an attempt to monopolize some
part of commerce. Their intent does not differ appreciably from
that of the gentlemen of yesteryear who were trying to corner a
market. The manner in which cooperative growth is achieved gov-
erns application of Section 2.
The attempt of the Dairy Co-op Association to monopolize the
Portland milk market has already been mentioned, along with its
success in Judge McColloch's court. 65
Probably the most significant Section 2 case is that of North
Texas Producers Ass'n. v. Metzger Dairies, Inc.,6 a civil action
for treble damages sent to the jury solely on Sherman Act, Section
2, issues. The complaint charged the association with attempting to
monopolize the Dallas-Fort Worth milk market and alleged that
the dairy cooperative controlled 85 to 90 percent of the market
supply and nearly all of the milk transportation, refused to trans-
port milk for non-members or sell milk to the plaintiff unless it
stopped dealing with non-members, had purchased milk processors
in the area and had secretly tried to purchase the plaintiff, and had
conducted boycotts and other coercive activities against the plaintiff.
The court found that the association had increased the price,
63. Flordla Citrus Mutual, supra note 88.
64. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
65. United States v. Dairy Co-op Ass'n, 49 F.Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943). Actually, it
is not fair to be too harsh with Judge McColloch, for even today the "other persons"
rule is nearly all-pervading, and no more solid test has been devised for areas of illegal
activity not prohibited because of the Borden rule.
66. 848 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1965). If it is not significant as a legal guidepost, it is at
least ignificant for the jury's treble damage award of $1,095,000.
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through bargaining, to 30 cents above the base price fixed by the
market administrator under a federal marketing order. The plaintiff
refused to agree to association demands and used its two trucks
to haul milk from distant markets at substantiallly greater cost.
To increase its economic pressure, the association (1) tried to cut
off plaintiff's sources of supply, (2) tried to buy plaintiff out, and (3)
conducted primary and secondary boycotts of plaintiff's products.
The plaintifff capitulated, but the association accepted such
conditionally, trying to extract promises that the plaintiff would
not purchase milk except from association members and that it
would turn control of hauling over to the association.
On these facts, the court said, "We conclude that the jury could
reasonably find from the evidence that the Association engaged in
monopolistic practices or attempts to monopolize prescribed by Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act."
'8 7
The Justice Department's complaint in the recent N.F.O. case8
was based entirely on Section 2 of the Sherman Act. These recent
cases support the rules suggested in Judge Wyzanski's jury charge
that cooperatives may, by natural, voluntary growth come to ac-
quire 100 percent of the market, but growth by other means-such
as by coercion or predatory practices-is not a legitimate object of
cooperatives and is not, therefore, within the cooperatives' priv-
ilege under the antitrust laws. 9
Finally, with regard to Section 2, definitions of the relevant
market may not be pleasing to leaders and attorneys of coopera-
tive associations. One might think that the great opportunities for
substitution of one food for another would invoke the "rule" of
the Cellophane case70 There is some evidence that the relevant
67. Id. at 196.
68. United States v. Nat'l Farmers Organization, supra note 39. Paragraph I of the
complaint read as follows: "in effecting the offense above, defendant has, among other
things:
(a) through threats, intimidation, harassment and acts of violence,
attempted to induce and induced non-member farmers not to sell milk and
not to sell milk and not to deliver milk to processors;
(c) through threats, intimidation, harassment and acts of violence,
attempted to induce and induced processors to cease operations and not to
receive milk."
69. Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. Nat'l Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F.Supp. 900 (D.
Mass. 1954) (Jury charge). Since the jury verdict was for the defendant, there was no
appeal and the instruction to the jury has not been firmly established as good law. No
doubt the "100 percent of the market" suggestion is unfavorably regarded in the Depart-
ment of Justice, so one may reasonably expect future complaints under Section 2 to
allege that monopoly powers have been acquired to an extent not permitted by law, as
well as in a manner not permitted by law. Indeed, such allegations were made in the
amended complaint in United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167
F.Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1958).
70. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956) (Dictum).
The relevant market was said to be wrapping materials (paper, foil, plastics, etc.)
rather than cellophane alone.
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market for agricultural products will be rather narrowly drawn.71
D. Mergers
Merger cases are meager, in the antitrust and agricultural
marketing associations area. At the present time, although it is
difficult to predict, cooperative mergers with other persons are tested
by approximately the same standards as are applied under section
7 of the Clayton Act 72 to other businesses.
The test case for section 7 was Maryland & Virginia Milk
Producers Ass'n. v. United States,73 where the trial court found
that the cooperative, supplying about 86 percent of the milk in the
Washington, D. C., area, acquired the Embassy Dairy in order to:
• . .eliminate the largest purchaser of non-Association milk
in the area; force former Embassy non-Association producers
either to join the Association or to ship to Baltimore, thus
both bringing more milk to the Association and diverting
competing milk to another market; eliminate the Associa-
tion's prime competitive dealer from government contract
milk bidding; and increase the Association's control of the
Washington market.74
On these facts, the Supreme Court found that a section 7 violation
had occurred and affirmed the District Court judgment for the
government on that section.
The Court had little trouble with the Association's Capper-Vol-
stead defense, finding nothing in the Act and its legislative history
to
suggest a congressional desire to vest cooperatives with un-
restricted power to restrain trade or to achieve monoply by
preying on independent producers, processors or dealers in-
tent on carrying on their own businesses in their own legiti-
mate way.
75
The case ended with a divestiture order and thus is likely to
be the classic merger case for cooperatives, just as Borden is
on price-fixing.
71. See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Case-Swayne Citrus Prod. Co., 369 F.2d 449 (1966),
cert. den. 387 U.S. 932 (1967). Appellee sought to establish that entire country was the
relevant market, relying on Cellophane, but the decision held that the orange-growing
area in California and Arizona was the relevant market.
72. 38 Stat. 781 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). This section prohibits a corporation
engaged in commerce from acquiring all or any part of the assets of another corporation
so engaged where the effect may be to tend to create a monopoly or substantially lessen
competition.
73. 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
74. Id. at 469.
75. Id. at 466-67.
ANTITRUST AND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 519
the acquisition alone was not decisive of the case. 76 Instead, the
acquisition taken with the manner in which the acquired dairy was
operated, in addition to other activities of the cooperative, was
found to be a predatory practice unprotected by Capper-Volstead.
77
Whether section 7 can have any application to a merger of
competing cooperatives remains to be seen. One would rather expect
that Judge Holtzoff's rule78 that cooperatives can combine so long
as no other persons are a part of the combination would apply.7 9
IV. BARGAINING-WHAT TO AVOID
After several years of losses from withholding and dumping of
commodities, non-recognition by purchasers, or mere lack of suc-
cess, producer-members of bargaining associations may seek to
drive hard bargains when the opportunity presents itself. The lawyer
who aids such glee may soon wish he had exercised restraint.
A. Exclusive Dealing
s °
At the outset, all thought of agreements which require processors
to purchase solely from association members should be quashed.
No better device can be developed to increase association member-
ship and bargaining power than the "closed shop," but it is entirely
coercive and, hence, illegal.-' Agreements requiring processors
to receive all production of members before receiving any from
non-members may be coercive and therefore suspect. The cases,
however, are all over the lot.
The first significant case for cooperatives considering full supply
contracts would caution not restraint but avoidance, 82 and it was
76. Bergilans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, Inc., 241 F.Supp. 476 (E.D.
Mo. 1965).
77. Id. The court rather routinely applied the "other persons" rule to dispose of the
case. The rule is so easy to apply that the cases can be disposed of essentially without
any reasoning at all; furthermore, the Justice Department can get Into court simply by
alleging agreements with other unknown persons not made defendants. There Is some
doubt that the rule, when written, was intended to be as all-pervading and as onerous
as it has become, although the Bergjians result is hard to criticize.
78. United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F.Supp. 151, 154
(D.D.C. 1956).
79. The deciding case may begin when a bargaining association acquires a processing
cooperative in order to gain additional members and some influence in the resale market.
While the United States Supreme Court has been presented some of these facts, it has
not been presented with a timely issue. See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith
Citrus Products Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962). Winckler dashed the hopes of some that a
broad rule would be established prohibiting conspiracies between a cooperative, its wholly-
owned subsidiary and an affiliated cooperative. But it did not entirely lay to rest some
concerns about cooperative mergers or intra-organization conspiracies.
80. Perhaps a word should be said about contracts between cooperatives and their
members. Such contracts frequently provide that the member must market exclusively
through the association, and these restrictions are universally upheld, at least so long
as they run for a reasonable period of time with reasonable opportunity for members
to cancel.
81. See United States v. Louisiana Fruit & Veg. Prod. Union, Criminal No. 24906,
CCII FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS Case No. 1173, (E.D. La., Apr. 28, 1954) (pleas of guilty
entered).
82. Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 34 F.Supp. 970 (D. Ore. 1939).
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decided by Judge McColloch, the man who in Dairy Co-op encouraged
cooperatives to think they were immune from antitrust law. The
case enjoined a fishermen's union from enforcing a full supply
contract which it had negotiated with a fish canner.83 The Borden
case provided the foundation for the decision, 4 the court viewing
the agreement as a conspiracy with another person to eliminate
competition in sales to canners.
An opposite result was reached by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, which upheld under Capper-Volstead a combination of (1)
grower contracts which required growers to market only to handlers
which had contracts with the association and (2) handler contracts
which required handlers to use only raw products of members or,
if the association consented, products of non-members on the same
terms as would be applicable to members. 85 The F.T.C. decision
did not discuss Borden, market foreclosure or other factors,
apparently finding such cooperative desires legitimate objects for
mutual benefit of members.
The middle ground between fish and fruit is represented by a
milk case in which the cooperative negotiated a full supply contract
to the extent it was able to provide supplies. 6 Since such a contract
does not entirely foreclose other suppliers, the agreement was
upheld. There was no showing by the government, however, that
the contracts were negotiated to suppress competition, and such a
showing might have changed the result.
Probably a percentage-of-requirements contract has the best
chance for survival. If a full supply contract has economic justifica-
tion and there are a significant number of other buyers in the
market, there seems now to be enough case law to avoid a blind
application of Borden to exclusive dealing.
B. Refusals to Deal.
There are not enough relevant cases applying antitrust law to
cooperatives to write a concise rule as to when an association may,
and when it may not, refuse to deal with a handler.
Of course, if the refusal is based upon the handler's financial
situation or unfavorable past experiences with him, no problem is
likely to result.
On the other hand, if the refusal is carried to the point it was
83. The case was decided under the Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act. 48 Stat
1213 (1934), 16 U.S.C. §§ 521-22 (1964), which parallels the Capper-Volstead Act, and
is frequently used as authority in agricultural decisions.
84. Supra note 82, aff'd 131 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1942).
85. Florida Citrus Mutual, 53 F.T.C. 973, 1010 (1957).
86. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n. v. United States, 193 F.2d 907 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), rever.ang 90 F.Supp. 681 (D.D.C. 1950).
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in North Texas Producers Ass'n,17 with a secondary boycott at
retail stores and many acts indicating a monopolistic purpose, there
is every reason to believe the refusal has no Clayton or Capper-
Volstead protection from severe antitrust penalties. In the absence
of various other attempts to increase market control, a naked re-
fusal to deal is probably insufficient to cause antitrust concerns.
If a handler refuses to submit to the negotiating process, there
can be little doubt that the association may forbid its members
to deal with him. If, however, the handler merely refuses agree-
ment to unessential terms, especially exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, the hope that Capper-Volstead may save the day wanes.
Refusals to sell products of like grade and quality at the same
prices may bring Robinson-Patman difficulties; but since the prices
of agricultural products fluctuate so frequently, the danger is minimal
so long as price demands are reasonable or entirely uniform.
Tied closely to the subject of refusals to deal is picketing and
group demonstrations, such as have been used by N.F.O. upon
occasion. During the N.F.O. milk withholding in March and April
of 1967, a temporary restraining order was issued which prohibited
the organization from engaging in any variety of picketing other
than peaceful, and which limited the number of pickets at any one
place to four.8  A more recent case 9 denies two organizations
of Western Pennsylvania dairymen antitrust and constitutional
protection for picketing retail stores in an attempt to induce
the stores to increase farmers' prices and stop dealing with a
cooperative competitor. A permanent injunction was granted pre-
venting future picketing and boycotts. 90
While the two cases above can be read for the rule that ineffective
picketing is legal while effective picketing is illegal, surely the law
is not so foolish. Picketing can be a useful practice in bargaining
for the sale of agricultural products. Since public policy favors
cooperative marketing, it is predictable that peaceful and intelligent
use of pickets, either for recognition or to build pressure during
87. Supra note 66 and the accompanying text.
88. United States v. Nat'l Farmers Organization, Inc., BNA ATTR No. 299, p. A-2
(S.D. Iowa Apr. 4, 1967). It is interesting to note that the N.F.O. was withholding all
over the country, which displays an intention to monopolize rather than an attempt to
market. Why else would a seller refuse to deal with every available buyer and choose
rather to dump milk on the ground? The Justice Department specifically did not seek,
and the court did not grant, any order prohibiting the then current or any future market
boycott. There likely was some feeling that Capper-Volstead permits such an action by
the association. Query whether the same feelings would exist if there was a possibility
that such action would succeed?
89. Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 261 F.Supp. 381 (W.D. Pa.
1966).
90. Id. The N.F.O. may have been far-sighted to settle out of court with the govern-
ment, pledging to give the Justice Department advance notice of any future withholding
actions and not to oppose future preliminary injunctions. These commitments extend
through 1972. BNA ATTR No. 334, p. A-13 (Dec. 5, 1967).
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negotiations, will not be enjoined so long as it is used for limited,
reasonable objectives.
V. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN
Bargaining cooperatives can expect that their birth and opera-
tions will not be greeted with the warmest kind of enthusiasm by
processors, packers and other handlers. After all, any manufacturer
aims to obtain his raw product at the lowest possible cost, and
handlers of agricultural products seem to have similar objectives.
What may an association expect and what remedies are avail-
able?
During the period of organization, some handlers have appar-
ently indicated to growers that they would or might lose their product
market if they joined a bargaining group.91 In many areas, any
overt indication by an important buyer or contractor that he is
displeased with the organizational effort may have a startling effect,
encouraging reluctance on the part of farmers to join. There is
at present no adequate legal remedy which may be used by an
association in its formative stages to prevent intimidation, coercion
and interference with farmers' and ranchers' rights to join and
belong to marketing and bargaining associations. 92 A bill pending
in the United States Congress would provide this remedy.93*
Once organization is completed and operations are begun, new
problems arise, the foremost of which is refusal on the part of hand-
lers to recognize or deal with the association of producers. Today,
such disputes must be settled entirely by economic power; no law
exists and no bill is pending, at least at the federal level, which
requires recognition and good faith bargaining. That is not to say,
however, that public debate has not given serious consideration
to the possibility of such a law.14 The National Farmers Organization
is, for the most part, at this stage today, and their fight for recog-
nition is as much in the newspapers as anywhere else, as is the
case with some of the Farm Bureau marketing associations and
others. The only real solution presently is not a legal one; rather
it is to increase membership to the point where some handlers
deal with the association in order to obtain needed supplies. This
approach to recognition, however, thrusts the operating cooperative
back into organizational problems.
91. Hearings on S. 109 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and
Forestry, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-24 (1966) [hereinafter cited as S. 109 Hearings].
92. Id.
93. S. 109 was passed by the Senate August 4, 1967, passed by the House Committee
on Agriculture on September 27, 1967 and is, at the time of this writing, pending before
the House Rules Committee. * Editor's Note: S.109 was enacted into law on April 16, 1968,
subsequent to Mr. Lemon's writing of this article. See 36 U.S.L.W. 97 (April 30, 1968).
94. See Wall Street Journal, Nov. 13, 1967, at 24, Col. 1.
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The matter of contract negotiations is, to some extent, governed
by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.9 5 The F.T.C.
has taken note of producers problems in attempting to collectively
sell agricultural products. 96 The problem which has been encoun-
tered with the F.T.C. remedy is that it is too slow. In early 1952,
certain processors were charged by the Commission with conspiring
to boycott certain producers. Not until mid-1956 did the F.T.C. issue
a cease and desist order, and court appeals followed.97 Thus, no
adequate remedy was available for the negotiating problem of the
1951 season.
The same problems of delay are found in Packers & Stockyards
Act application. 98 A complaint that Ralston Purina Co. and other
blacklisted and boycotted poultry growers in 1962 was terminated,
assuming there are no court appeals, on January 23, 1968 by the
issuance of a cease and desist order against the processing firms.99
S.109, now pending, would provide timely injunctive relief in
some of these situations.
If, because of lack of negotiating strength, an association can
market some product successfully, but not all of what it has avail-
able, it may fall into illegal activities before it has a chance to
succeed. Discrimination among members and granting some mem-
bers advantages over others can lead to trouble. 100
VI. REFLECTIONS
The possibilities for improving farm income through collective
bargaining in the sale of agricultural products may be overrated.
Nevertheless, there is room for increased marketing efficiency
-through advance contracting, producing to specifications, etc.-
which can result from bargaining.
Very little can be borrowed from labor's experience and applied
directly to agricultural marketing associations, for several reasons.
First, the time is the late Sixties rather than the Twenties and
Thirties, and public sensibilities have changed. Second, government
intervention in labor disputes has generally been helpful to labor,
but such cannot be expected in agriculture because the connection
95. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). The section declares unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive practices or acts to be unlawful.
96. S. 109 Hearings, supra note 91, at 34-36.
97. Id. at 36.
98. 42 Stat. 161 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 192 (1964). The terms are approximately the same
as section 5 of the F.T.C. Act. but they relate to packers, dealers and handlers of live-
stock and meats.
99. -Agr. Dec.-; Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 1968, at 14, col. 8.
100. Of. California Canning Peach Growers v. Downey, 76 Cal. App. 1, 243 P. 679 (1925);
Wheelwright v. Pure Milk Assrn, 208 Wis. 53, 242 N.W. 486 (1932).
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between bargaining and consumer prices is clearer to the public in
the case of food. Third, farmers and ranchers are private enter-
prisers, free and able to expand production whenever there is a
price incentive to do so. The adverse effects of rising wage rates
for labor are not physical surpluses and consequently are not
readily apparent. Thus, there is in labor no pressure for the govern-
ment to allocate jobs in the high-wage industries.
As producers increasingly turn greater interest toward market-
ing, little leniency or sympathy can be expected from persons who
administer trade regulation laws. Some specialized groups of com-
modity producers, located in compact geographical areas, have
formed marketing cooperatives which have become very influential
and successful. The courts are beginning to recognize the fact that
these cooperatives are big business and are treating them as such.
The resulting case law, however, is equally applicable to the fledg-
ling upstarts seeking to associate widely-dispersed producers of basic
commodities and livestock to bargain with giants of American
industry.
Much more will be needed for success than an attorney able
to walk the producer associations' antitrust tightrope, but that man
is a necessary ingredient. Advice which is too cautious may be as
harmful to the effort as would be a cease and desist order resulting
from carefree advice. The best that can be said is that any lawyer
who can guide a powerful association through Sherman, Clayton
and the rest without losing his grip on Capper-Volstead can render
significant service to his profession, to agriculture and to the Nation.
